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The chapter title appears self-evident—of course family structure
matters!  Surely the quirks and turns of one’s personal life—which for
almost everyone is inextricably commingled with their family’s
lives—would have measurable effects on almost everything that you
do, including whether or not you work, how much you earn, and a host
of other facts about your work experience.  It would have seemed
unreasonable to have instead titled this essay: How family structure
doesn’t affect labor market outcomes.
But it turns out that uncovering exactly how family structure mat-
ters is not a trivial undertaking.  Because economics is not in general an
experimental science, it is difficult to make a convincing argument that
family structure matters, holding all other factors constant that are
potentially correlated with family structure.  We can’t just randomly
assign people to different family structures in which to spend their
lives and see what happens.  Untangling the actual “family assign-
ment” mechanism from the outcome is a difficult problem that
researchers have tackled using a number of methodological
approaches.  We will gauge how convincing their solutions are, and the
degree to which taking this problem seriously modifies the raw num-
bers that we see in the unmassaged data.
In this chapter I will first define family structure and labor market
outcomes, and show you examples of the kinds of patterns that lead
people to believe that family structure influences labor market out-
comes.  I will briefly outline the theoretical reasoning that leads one to
believe that family structure would matter, as well as the reasoning that
can lead one to believe that it matters less than most people might
think.  In the next section I consider the evidence from a number of
studies that attempt to measure carefully the effects of family struc-
ture—particularly marital status and presence or absence of children in
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the household—on labor force participation and earnings measures.  I
conclude by looking at a few studies that consider aspects of family
structure more broadly defined, and by discussing whether the results
shown have relevance for any particular policy initiatives.
WHAT IS FAMILY STRUCTURE?
Family structure can refer to anything about a person’s past and
present living conditions and relational structure.  But we need a nar-
row definition of a family to understand the way data are commonly
collected by statistical agencies.  Let’s look at the U.S. Census Bureau/
Department of Labor definition, which relies on both relation and co-
residence: “A family is a group of two persons or more (one of whom
is the householder) residing together and related by birth, marriage, or
adoption. All such persons (including related subfamily members) are
considered as members of one family.”  Hence, while a household
“consists of all the persons who occupy a house, an apartment, or other
group of rooms, or a room, which constitutes a housing unit,” a family
household “is a household maintained by a family (as defined above),
and may include among the household members any unrelated persons
(unrelated subfamily members and/or unrelated individuals) who may
be residing there” (U.S. Department of Labor 1995).
Using these definitions, in order to see how families might vary
and how they overlap with households, consider the concrete case of
the United States population as of March 1999 (most of the results I
present in this paper are based on U.S. data, and the remaining results
come from other developed countries; I do not argue that the results are
necessarily more widely applicable).  Let us consider three widespread
phenomena (and their absence): people living more than one to a
household, people living with someone they are married to, and people
living with their own children (under 18) in a household.
Figure 1 displays the proportions of households that fall into these
types of categories and shows how these numbers vary by sex.  The
convention is to define either an individual or a married couple as the
householder(s), i.e., the person(s) in whose name(s) the housing unit is
owned or rented.  We see that out of the 100 million U.S. households in
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Figure 1 The Proportional Distribution of U.S. Households, by Various 
Characteristics, 1999
103,874,000 households (all percentages are out of this total)
NOTE: “Child” refers to own child under 18.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (2000, Tables 60, 62,
65).
1999, slightly more than half were headed by a married couple and
more than one-quarter were female-headed; the remaining 18 percent
were male-headed households.  Female- and male-headed households
can be further subdivided into family and nonfamily households, of
which a majority are nonfamily households (i.e., do not contain related
persons).  Nonfamily households can consist of one or more nonrelated
persons; 5.5 percent of all households consisted of unrelated persons,
while over a quarter of all households (25.7 percent) contained only
one person.  Hence, about two-thirds of all households are family
households.  Only 1.9 percent of married couples do not have their own
household, so being married is highly related to maintaining a family
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household (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
2000, Table 60).  Neither households nor families are particularly large
in general: the average household size is 2.61 persons and the average
family size is 3.18 persons (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census 2000, Table 60).  Notably, the idealized view of the
“nuclear family” as consisting of a married couple with two or more
children is found in less than 15 percent of households—about one of
every seven—although potentially many more of us are in such house-
holds for at least some percentage of our lives.
Even while maintaining the U.S. statistical agencies’ narrow defi-
nition of a family, one might further refine one’s view of living condi-
tions that might matter in a number of ways.  For instance, one might
examine more closely the different types of “nonmarriage”: cohabita-
tion; previously married, but now widowed, divorced, or separated; liv-
ing alone; or living with other persons in a nonsexual relationship.  One
might also want to know if previous structure has lasting effects; for
example, does a divorced person appear quite different from a wid-
owed person, and do both of those appear different from someone who
has never married?
One might also want to know more about the type of marriage that
one is in.  Do the spouses largely conform to traditional roles within the
marriage?  Do both spouses work?  Which spouse earns more?  One
might also want to know more about the age structure of the family,
including the ages of the children and, potentially, also of the spouses.
One might also be interested in how one relates to other family
members who may reside in other households.  One might be in a care-
giver relationship with an elderly and/or disabled family member who
lives elsewhere.  One might have a dependent who does not live in the
household but who still represents some level of financial (and emo-
tional) obligation.
In addition, one might wonder how family structure in the past
affects one today.  Perhaps one’s siblings continue to exert an influence
even after one no longer interacts with them daily.  Children, grand-
children, parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins, and in-laws all
potentially affect your current life in measurable ways, whether or not
you currently interact with them regularly.
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WHAT ARE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES?
What sorts of outcomes might we measure?  As an economist, my
mind naturally turns to observable, independently verifiable outcomes
such as earnings and hours worked.  For the purposes of this chapter,
we will consider three outcome measures: two measures of labor sup-
ply, labor force participation (work/not work), and hours worked; and
hourly earnings.  This by no means exhausts the range of outcomes.
Netz and Haveman (1999) make a good case for including family
structure variables as potential controls/predictors for studying a wide
range of labor market outcomes—such as unemployment duration—
where researchers have not normally thought to include such variables.
However, much of the extant empirical work has in fact considered one
or more of these three outcomes.
First let’s see what the raw numbers can show us.  Table 1 shows
some calculations for prime-age adults (ages 25 to 54) for the United
States in March 1999.  For this group, consider first their labor force
participation rate (i.e., the proportion that is either currently employed
or actively looking for paid work).  Women are less likely to be partic-
ipating in the labor force if married, while the opposite holds for men.
The hours effect for those who are working goes in a similar direction.
Women in larger families, measured by either number of persons or
number of children, have reduced participation and hours.  Men in
larger families have higher participation but little variation in hours,
and men in very large families have reduced values for both measures.
Married persons earn more per hour worked than do unmarried per-
sons, but the effect appears to be much stronger for men than for
women.  Women in larger families have substantially reduced hourly
earnings, while for men in very large families hourly earnings first rise
and then fall, with little difference in the midrange (two to five people;
one to three children).
Before taking these hourly earnings rates as given, we might first
want to consider how aggregation affects these patterns.  For instance,
maybe married and unmarried persons have very different demo-
graphic characteristics, like their age distribution (which could relate
both to generic lifecycle differences and differences by birth cohort).
By showing results only for persons between 25 and 54 in Table 1, I
























All persons 77 38 11.53 43,000 29,573 92 44 15.38 46,000 27,360
Currently married 74 37 11.54 56,000 19,339 94 45 16.83 56,000 18,126
Currently
unmarried 82 40 11.11 23,000 10,234 87 43 12.82 30,000 9,234
Number of 
persons in family
1 85 41 12.82 24,000 4,319 89 44 13.75 27,000 5,955
2 81 39 12.02 44,000 6,925 90 44 15.38 50,000 5,423
3 79 38 11.43 47,000 6,280 92 44 15.38 53,000 5,178
4 74 36 11.11 54,000 6,762 95 45 16.53 58,000 6,066
5 68 35 10.00 52,000 3,360 94 45 16.35 56,000 3,042
≥6 62 35 8.65 44,000 1,927 90 44 13.00 48,000 1,696
Number of 
children in family
0 81 40 12.02 40,000 13,912 89 44 14.42 40,000 14,552
1 79 38 11.54 47,000 5,980 94 45 16.48 55,000 4,741
139
2 74 36 10.99 48,000 6,050 96 45 16.83 55,000 5,110
3 66 34 9.62 42,000 2,610 95 45 16.73 51,000 2,164
≥4 55 33 7.92 32,000 1,021 92 46 14.42 41,000 793
NOTE: Hours and hourly earnings are calculated only for those persons reporting nonzero values.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1999).
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have already controlled for age to some degree, but it could be done
more carefully.  It turns out that the same patterns appear if I look
within narrower age ranges, say 10-year age ranges (25–34, 35–44, 45–
54).  I might also want to consider different types of non-marriedness,
such as widowed, divorced, separated, or never married.  For these
middle-aged persons, the differences in outcomes between these cate-
gories is quite small; current marital status (rather than past marital his-
tory) becomes the important distinction.
We might also want to control simultaneously for marital status
and family size using a multiple regression framework to see the
effects of each factor while holding constant the other factor.  Let’s
consider the family structure effects on earnings using this idea.
Applying a simple model to the hourly earnings data described in
Table 1 (using the natural log of hourly earnings as the dependent vari-
able, and with no other controls except for age and age-squared), for
men, being married is associated with a 22 percent higher earnings
rate, while the number of children has no effect; for women, being
married is associated with 5 percent higher hourly earnings, while each
child is associated with a 6 percent drop in hourly earnings.
WHY ARE FAMILY STRUCTURE AND LABOR MARKET 
OUTCOMES RELATED?
For both men and women, but particularly for men, marriage is
associated with higher hourly earnings.  For women, each additional
child is associated with lower hourly earnings.  Why do we see these
patterns?
I derived these percentages from a very sparse regression specifi-
cation, in which many of the usual variables that we would associate
with earnings rates, like one’s education and work experience, were
missing.  So one obvious answer is that marriage and number of chil-
dren are serving as proxies for a number of omitted variables that are
directly related to productivity as rewarded in the labor market.
Indeed, these variables are often included in regressions, particularly
for data sets where not many other variables are available, in order to
serve as proxy for these other measures (Hill 1979).  These might
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include labor force attachment, pre- and postschool human capital
investments, stability, restrictions on work location and hours, absen-
teeism, and turnover.  Hence, studies that include a longer list of con-
trol variables should drive these family effects toward zero.
One problem with this approach is that not all variables that are
related to labor market productivity are available in the kind of data
sets that are generally available.  For instance, many measures of abil-
ity or effort might be important to employers but are not collected in
surveys.  The person surveyed might not even know how other people
view his or her actions and abilities.  And these unobservable differ-
ences across persons are potentially correlated with whether or not they
marry and how many children they have.
We could get away from the omitted variable problem completely
if we could randomly assign people to marry or not marry (and whom
to marry!), and randomly assign people to have different numbers of
children.  Indeed, if you think that marriage markets are like a lottery in
the sense that love strikes almost randomly, this would not be a prob-
lem.  But as we will see shortly, there is evidence that people do not
randomly marry with respect to economic factors.  Indeed, exactly the
opposite occurs: currently, potential high earners are likely to marry
other high earners.  Similarly, if you think that the number of children a
family has is basically an act of God, then we have a natural experi-
ment as to how children affect labor market outcomes.
Another problem is that even if you find that persons with certain
features are both more likely to marry and to make more money, this
could still be due to either effort or discrimination.  How could this be?
Let’s consider the theoretical arguments for the two main phenomena
we have observed with respect to earnings: 1) women with children
earn less than women without children, and 2) married men earn more
than unmarried men.  This will also help us understand why labor force
participation and hours might vary in the ways shown in Table 1.
One of the main arguments economists will give for why people
marry (or at least for why they live together) is that marriage allows for
gains in household output due to increasing the spouses’ ability to spe-
cialize.  Hence, a couple’s total household output would likely be
greater than the sum of what they were able to produce separately, par-
ticularly if they can increasingly specialize over the course of the mar-
riage.  If women have comparative advantage (i.e., are relatively
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better) at home production, they will be less likely to work for pay after
marriage.  Children raise the value of time spent in home production,
so children can amplify this effect considerably.  Meanwhile, married
men can specialize in market-related human capital investments,
thereby increasing their productivity over time.  In some cases, the
woman may choose to devote her time to forwarding the man’s career,
again in cases where this time investment has a higher payoff than
either her working in the market herself, or spending the time in other
forms of nonmarket production.
But what about cases where we observe both spouses working for
pay?  The argument must then be extended to say that women with
children are less productive than both childless women and all men per
hour worked in the market.  This could happen for a number of rea-
sons.  They may be directly less productive because they have invested
less in the past in market-related human capital.  Many women take
time off to raise children before reentering the labor market; hence,
women on average have less total work experience than do men, as
well as less time with their current employer.  Even if they had the
same amount of total work experience or total job tenure, leaving the
labor force for more than six months in order to raise children is in and
of itself associated with lower hourly earnings (Jacobsen and Levin
1995), possibly because their human capital has depreciated during
their absence from the labor market.  Also, anticipating discontinuous
employment, they may have invested in forms of human capital that
were less likely to depreciate, or that might be more useful in a variety
of geographic locations if they will be moving to further their spouse’s
career.
Another possibility is that rather than less human capital being
applied per hour of work, women with children are applying less effort
per hour of work.  If at-home production requires a certain amount of
one’s fixed daily stock of energy, the person doing more at-home pro-
duction may exert less effort per hour of market production.  Note that
the opposite effect potentially occurs for men who are freed from
responsibilities for at-home production, and for men whose wives are
actively supporting their career (throwing parties for their colleagues
and customers, accompanying them on trips), the employer may really
be receiving twice the effort per hour of work.
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Alternatively, women may be applying equal amounts of both
effort and human capital per hour but may be constrained in their selec-
tion of jobs to those that have flexible and/or part-time hours.  It is well
documented that such jobs generally have lower earnings rates, poten-
tially because these are desirable features, or because such jobs are less
valuable to employers.  Hence women’s desire to reduce hours of paid
work so as to spend more time in nonmarket production leads to their
lower earnings per hour.  Meanwhile, married men may select jobs that
have fewer amenities (including but not limited to flexibility) but
higher wages (Reed and Harford 1989).  In other words, there exist
jobs with higher pay but fewer amenities and jobs with lower pay but
greater amenities, and people sort systematically between them based
on gender and family structure.
That outlines the basic neoclassical economic argument for why
marital status and number of children would have effects on labor force
participation, hours, and earnings: marriage and children alter one’s
relative productivity between home and work and potentially one’s
choice of pecuniary and nonpecuniary amenities related to work.  Note,
however, that for any point made above, it is possible to make an alter-
native argument that marital status and number of children either won’t
or will matter in the opposite direction.  For example, the potential
endogeneity of the human capital investment decision will make it hard
to measure the full effects of marriage and children on current earn-
ings; there may be no current effect, but past anticipation of becoming
married with children will have led women to invest in less human cap-
ital than they would have otherwise.  However, if most women plan to
(or assume that they will) become married and have children, this will
depress women’s earnings relative to men but will have little effect on
the differential earnings between married and unmarried women.
It is also possible to derive alternative explanations for why these
phenomena occur.  In particular, marriage and children might alter not
only one’s choice set but also one’s preferences.  For example, married
men might work harder because now there are other people—people
whom they care about—whose well-being is affected by their level of
income.
Another alternative explanation is that society (broadly defined,
but also narrowly defined as employers) prefers certain familial config-
urations to others, potentially for economic reasons, and attempts to
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reward persons who conform to these norms while penalizing those
who do not.  So married men, particularly those with stay-at-home
wives, receive higher pay raises and more frequent promotions.  Mean-
while, women find it difficult to combine work with home duties, and
employers make it no easier for them.  Employers may favor the tradi-
tional style of marriage out of simple prejudice and a desire to replicate
the male-dominated management structure that they have become
accustomed to.  An alternative, statistical, discrimination theory would
be that employers use family structure as a proxy for the unobservable
factors of effort, emotional stability, and turnover (i.e., marriage and
children are good for men but bad for women).
To sum up, we see that there are four main categories of explana-
tions for why there might be differences in earnings and labor market
work associated with changes in family structure: both absolute and
relative productivity in market work may be affected; preferences are
altered; trade-offs between higher pay and higher job amenities are in
part based on family structure; and discrimination—either prejudicial
or statistical—occurs.  It is not necessary to pick one of these explana-
tions over the others; rather, they might all be operating simulta-
neously, each accounting for some proportion of the wage and
employment differences.
In addition, we see that there are a number of reasons why it would
be hard to observe these effects cleanly using nonexperimental data:
selection into marriage and into child raising must be taken account of
to the degree that both observable and nonobservable factors affecting
selection are correlated with either productivity or preferences regard-
ing market versus nonmarket work.  Various studies have taken these
different theoretical and empirical considerations seriously.  We will
see how they have reduced—or strengthened—the marital wage pre-
mium for men and the family wage penalty for women.  I will briefly
summarize the range of results and sum up my views in each of these
two cases.
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THE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE
Many studies have considered the puzzle of why married men earn
more.  This premium varies across studies from zero to 30 percent,
depending on the particular data set and time period studied and on the
nature of the empirical methodology.  The premium clearly persists if
standard, observable controls for productivity are added, such as edu-
cational attainment and actual or estimated work experience (Hill
1979), and is larger for persons in professional and managerial occupa-
tions (Pfeffer and Ross 1982).  Following people over time, which is a
way of controlling for unobservable variables, indicates that wages rise
after marriage, and that the managerial and professional effect appears
to be related to receiving higher performance ratings and therefore
being more likely to be promoted to higher, better-paying jobs (Koren-
man and Neumark 1991).  These results are all consistent with both the
higher productivity and the discrimination arguments.
However, in controlling for unobservables that affect both wages
and marital status, a number of studies have found that the marital sta-
tus premium is greatly reduced or eradicated (Cohen and Haberfeld
1991; Cornwell and Rupert 1995; Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987, 1997;
Loh 1996).  There is also some reason to believe that the marital pre-
mium is declining over time.  This may be related not only to reduced
differences in human capital investment between married and unmar-
ried men (Blackburn and Korenman 1994), but also to reduced special-
ization in market work during marriage, possibly related to rising
divorce probabilities (Gray 1997; Gray and Vanderhart 2000).  On the
other hand, a recent study using the 1999 March CPS finds that even
after controlling for endogeneity of marital status, married men have a
13 percent wage premium (Chun and Lee 2001).
A number of studies (Chalmers 1996; Jacobsen and Rayack 1996;
Blackaby, Carlin, and Murphy 1998; Hotchkiss and Moore 1999; Chun
and Lee 2001) have considered differences among married men in the
marital wage premium, specifically how their spouse’s work hours
might affect the wage premium.  These studies generally find differ-
ences, after controlling for observable productivity-related characteris-
tics, of approximately 15 percent between married men whose wives
do not work and married men whose wives work full time.  By the
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effort argument put forth above, we should observe that a man who has
a nonworking wife will have higher wages because his wife is free to
dedicate relatively more time to furthering his career, either directly
through career-related activities, or indirectly by freeing him from
almost all home production obligations.  However, this effect could
also be due to one or both of two alternative explanations: the assorta-
tive mating effect, in this case leading to matches between men who
have high market productivity and women who have high nonmarket
productivity; and the endogeneity of spousal work hours.  In other
words, if a man is a high earner, his wife reduces her paid work time,
even potentially increasing leisure time rather than home production.
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) find that the effect disappears in U.S. data
(the Panel Study of Income Dynamics) when either of these two alter-
native explanations is controlled for and Chalmers (1996) finds that
controlling for endogeneity alone is enough to eradicate the phenome-
non in five different data sets (data from the Luxembourg Income
Study for Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
States).  However, Hotchkiss and Moore (1999) find that the effect per-
sists in U.S. data for managerial occupations, as do Blackaby, Carlin,
and Murphy (1998) for a United Kingdom data set; and Chun and Lee
(2001) find that the effect persists in a broader sample of men in the
United States even when controlling simultaneously for marital endo-
geneity and hours endogeneity.
The effects of marriage on women have received less attention, but
the slight positive wage premium related to marriage appears to persist
even when heterogeneity and endogeneity bias are accounted for.  Neu-
mark and Korenman (1994), using data on sisters to control for these
factors, find a positive marriage premium for white women.  Using a
different data set, however, they previously found no direct effect on
women’s wages (Korenman and Neumark 1992).  Jacobsen and Levin
(1995) find no statistically significant effect of current marital status
once fairly detailed controls for work experience, including intermit-
tency spells, are included.
The difficulty of considering all explanations simultaneously,
using a data set that has good controls for human capital variables (par-
ticularly work experience and intermittency measures) and controlling
for heterogeneity and endogeneity, shows up in these differing results.
Based on the current studies, I am not completely willing to concede
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that there is currently in the United States any marital wage premium
for men or women.  This is clearly an area of active research, and one
where more research, including more replicative and summarizing
studies, is needed.
THE EFFECTS OF CHILDREN
A topic that has received even more ink and has been equally con-
troversial has been the effects of childbearing and child raising on
female labor supply and earnings.  The reduced earnings effect oper-
ates largely through the reduced labor supply effect and is more rele-
vant for total family earnings than on hourly earnings.  However, there
does appear to be an effect even on the hourly earnings rate, as we saw
in Table 1.  Waldfogel (1998) argues that there is still an effect in U.S.
data, and that the penalty is in the 10 to 15 percent range in comparing
women with children to women with no children.  Again, as with the
men, we might first want to know how adding traditional observable
controls for productivity affects this finding.  Indeed, studies that have
added such controls, particularly for work experience and job tenure,
have reduced considerably the effect of children on wage, adding cre-
dence to the idea that the presence of children in the household is to a
large degree a proxy for these direct productivity effects (Hill 1979;
Jacobsen and Levin 1995; Lundberg and Rose 2000).  But how to treat
the endogeneity of work experience and job tenure is contentious.
Korenman and Neumark (1992) argue that if this endogeneity is not
controlled for (i.e., the effects of children in reducing these measures is
taken into account), the negative effect of children on wages is under-
stated.
One study that considered the family gap across seven developed
countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States,
Germany, Finland, and Sweden) finds much variation in the effects of
children on both employment and wages, with the largest wage penalty
for children in the United Kingdom (Harkness and Waldfogel 1999).
In the United Kingdom, the presence of children still strongly inhibits
full-time employment, and the low pay in part-time work appears to be
an important explanation of the “family gap” in wages (Joshi, Macran,
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and Dex 1996; Joshi et al. 1999).  These findings raise the question of
how institutional differences across countries can affect this gap,
potentially through the indirect link of children to wages through
reducing labor force attachment.
A method that avoids the endogeneity and heterogeneity problems
is to use natural experiments involving multiple births and the gender
mix of children.  In other words, to the extent that multiple births are
not planned and that people aim to have children of specific genders
and therefore might have additional children if the first one or two are
not of the desired sex, these outcomes cause increases in the number of
children in a family over what the family might have desired.  These
studies generally find rather small additional child effects on both labor
supply and earnings (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000).  Another study in
this vein (Jacobsen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom 1999) finds small effects
of total fertility on married women’s labor supply and earnings,
depressing labor supply by 2.5 percent and hours worked by two per
week per additional child, and essentially no effect on hourly earnings,
which is consistent with the raw numbers in Table 1.
Another method that attempts to measure directly whether time
and effort spent on household production affects labor market out-
comes is to measure the effects of household production directly.
Studies using a variety of econometric specifications (Hersch 1991a,b;
Hersch and Stratton 1997, 2002) have indeed found a significant nega-
tive effect on women’s wages of time spent on housework; approxi-
mately 10 weekly hours of housework reduces hourly earnings by
about 2 percent (Stratton 2001).  Housework hours variations by mari-
tal status are fairly large for women and may even be relevant in
explaining the negative wage differentials related to the presence of
children (although this particular specification was not tested by the
mentioned studies).  In contrast, results have been inconclusive for
men, with the possibility of a smaller negative impact or no effect
(Hersch 1991b; Hersch and Stratton 1997, 2002), while the other study
(Hersch 1991a) actually found a slight positive effect of time spent on
housework on men’s wages.  Notably, Hersch and Stratton (2000) find
that married and single men spend virtually the same amount of time
on home production, “albeit on different types of housework”; not sur-
prisingly, they also find no effect of housework on the marital wage
premium for men.
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Note that while one interpretation of these results is that time spent
on housework reduces one’s ability to do well in the labor market,
another interpretation is that time spent on housework is a proxy nega-
tively correlated with drive or ambition in the labor market.  In addi-
tion, the negative effect can operate through creation of a constraint
(i.e., picking part-time positions with lower wage rate) rather than
through effort or flextime (Stratton 2001).
Another line of research has attempted to measure attitudes toward
family life directly and use these attitudinal measures as control vari-
ables.  Interestingly, while Rose and Winkler (2000) find that women’s
inclinations toward traditional roles in the family are correlated with
lower labor force attachment and earnings, Cappelli, Constantine, and
Chadwick (2000) find that persons placing a high priority on family
before entering the labor market earn more; women who place a high
priority on family do not suffer in terms of subsequent earnings.
Fewer studies have bothered to consider the effects of children on
men, given the apparent absence of a strong effect in the raw data on
either hours or earnings (although Hersch [1991b] finds a positive
effect of presence of children on both male and female wages).  How-
ever, Carlin and Flood (1997) consider this question in the context of
the contemporary Swedish experience and find a small reduction in
male labor supply (2.6 to 3.4 hours per week) related to the presence of
one or more young children in the household.  Lundberg and Rose
(2000) find that in U.S. households where the mother continues to
work, the father reduces hours worked substantially.  Preston (2000)
presents an interesting statistical discrimination model in which
employers are unable initially to observe long-term career prospects,
but once parenthood occurs, true child care responsibilities are
observed and both women and men are tracked correctly into high- or
low-career orientation paths.  In her data, earnings differentials
between men and women fall to zero once the share of child care
responsibility is included in the analysis.
To sum up, again there is difficulty in considering all explanations
simultaneously, using a data set that has good controls for human capi-
tal variables (particularly work experience and intermittency measures)
and controlling for heterogeneity and endogeneity.  In addition, the
philosophical question arises of whether children’s indirect effects in
reducing labor force attachment should be credited to the children per
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se.  However, without crediting these indirect effects, the effects of
children on female labor market behavior appear to be relatively small.
OTHER FAMILY STRUCTURE EFFECTS
Now that we have considered the two main veins of the research
literature on family structure effects, we turn briefly to outlining other
topics that are of interest but have received less focus by researchers.
A number of persons have been interested in the recent rise in cohabi-
tation, particularly in this country and in Western Europe, particularly
in Sweden (Waite and Gallagher 2000).  Cohabitation appears to have
some of the productivity advantages of married life, such as the possi-
bility of day-to-day specialization.  But it lacks the ones that rely on a
long-term relationship, as such couples are not willing to specialize
more completely, given the uncertainty inherent in a nonformal rela-
tionship.
Another phenomenon of some interest is the increased number and
proportion of dual-earner couples, mainly in the United States, in
which the wife earns more than the husband (Winkler 1998).  While
this is an outcomes measure, it also has implications for how bargain-
ing in the home is affected, an area of increased research in general by
theoreticians.  Another phenomenon of interest concurrent with the
increase in dual-earner couples is the apparent rise in correlation
between husbands’ and wives’ earnings.  This is in contrast to the ear-
lier argument that high-earner husbands might well pick wives who
had relatively high nonmarket production capabilities, a feature that
was assumed to be generally negatively correlated with high market
production capability (Nakosteen and Zimmer 2001).  This has been of
particular interest for its implications regarding income inequality
between families, although so far changes in wives’ earnings do not
explain a substantial portion of the rise in family income inequality that
has occurred since the 1980s (Cancian and Reed 1999). 
Another topic that has been barely studied yet in a systematic
empirical way is the implications of the rising number of elderly and
how they may be cared for in both resident and nonresident settings by
their close relatives.  A related topic is how families deal with disabled
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members of any age.  It is known that a majority of caregivers for both
household members and persons outside the household are women
(Schmittroth 1991, Tables 111, 113).  It appears that the existence of a
dependent elder in a family household is negatively correlated with
earnings of adults in their immediate family (Tilly and Albelda 1994);
linkages with nonresident dependent elders, where effects may operate
through the need to provide both time and money toward their care,
have yet to be clearly measured in terms of their effects on labor mar-
ket outcomes for caregivers.  For instance, one study finds no evidence
of reduced employment among married women caregivers (Wolf and
Soldo 1994), while other studies find that caregivers have significantly
reduced employment (Ettner 1995; White-Means 1992).
Finally, a number of studies have considered labor market effects
related to the situation of one’s birth family rather than one’s current
family.  While some studies (Neumark and Korenman 1994) have
exploited sibling and parental relationships in an attempt to control for
unobservables that are correlated across family members, others have
considered directly the effects of family size, birth order, and/or sibling
gender mix on one’s own outcomes.  These effects have in large part
been modeled as affecting one’s human capital investments, such as
educational attainment, prior to entering the labor market.  Regarding
family size, Kessler (1991) finds no effect on wages but finds some
relation to labor supply for women—women from small families work
less when young, more when older.  Regarding birth order effects,
Behrman and Taubman (1986) find favorable labor market outcomes
for first-born children, Kessler finds no effect on wages of birth order,
and Oettinger (2000) finds that older sibling educational achievement
positively affects younger sibling educational achievement.  Regarding
sibling gender mix, Butcher and Case (1994) find that women raised
only with brothers received more education than women raised with
any sisters.  In contrast, Kaestner (1997) finds no such effect among
whites, and finds that among blacks, sisters are positively related to
educational attainment, while Hauser and Kuo (1998) find no effect of
sibling gender composition on educational attainment.
While the aforementioned studies all use contemporary U.S. data,
these topics have also been considered using historical data (Sassler
1995) and data from developing countries—indeed, birth family struc-
ture effects appear to be of increasing interest now that more data are
152 Jacobsen
available from these countries that allow for empirical research.  In the
developing country context, interest has centered on health indicators
as well as educational indicators, and effects appear larger.  For exam-
ple, Garg and Morduch (1998), using Ghanaian data, find that children
with sisters but no brothers score 25 to 40 percent better on measured
health indicators than if they have only brothers.  A final topic, con-
tinuing linkages to one’s birth family (without necessarily implying
any type of direct income or hours transfers), has barely been consid-
ered, although Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) find that relative
income comparisons to one’s sisters and sisters-in-law are significant
in explaining the increase in female labor supply.
POLICY-RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, let us briefly consider two questions.  Does family
structure matter enough for labor market outcomes that we should do
anything about it?  If so, what should we do?  From my preceding dis-
cussion, it is clear that I think it is far from obvious that these effects
are large enough to cause concern.  But even if they were large, the
issue of whether there is anything amiss here is not obvious.
If the premia and penalties we observe were clearly the result of
prejudicial discrimination, as opposed to being based on productivity
differences, compensating differentials, or marriage market matching,
then we would want to eradicate it.  This is the argument given for
making sex and race discrimination illegal, and indeed, we also make
questions regarding one’s family status illegal for employers to ask.
However, unlike sex and race discrimination, because family status is a
choice variable and is changeable, it is less obvious that anything
should be done.  The usual argument that discrimination is distortion-
ary would hold, but it is apparently discrimination against women as a
whole that is problematic, not necessarily against women who are mar-
ried mothers.  Policy proposals that reduce discrimination against
women in general would have the effect of raising the return to invest-
ments in their human capital, regardless of either their expectations or
outcomes regarding marriage and child rearing.
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One conclusion we can draw from positive marriage premiums for
both working men and women (and potentially positive premiums
achieved by those who specialize in nonmarket production as well) is
that marriage is an efficiency-raising device, which might be encour-
aged therefore on efficiency grounds alone.  Indeed, Waite and Gal-
lagher (2000) argues a strong case for taking societal actions to
strengthen society’s commitment to the institution of marriage, in part
on economic grounds, and in part on a number of other grounds,
including its apparent causal linkage to better mental, physical, and
emotional health.
But most work/family policy initiatives are suggested in order to
reduce the negative outcomes associated with child raising, particularly
with raising children while unmarried.  These include high rates of
poverty and near-poverty for female-headed families, whether created
through out-of-wedlock birth or divorce.  Direct income transfers and
attempts to increase the human capital of such families are two such
policies.  Note that neither of these need be directly associated with the
family structure so much as with the low state of human capital invest-
ment in these persons to begin with.  Another set of policies attempts to
reduce the income penalty associated with taking parental leaves from
one’s career, or stepping down to part-time work.  Paid parental leaves
and child care subsidies can have measurable effects, both directly by
increasing a family’s income, and indirectly by increasing labor force
attachment.  To the extent that these preserve human capital invest-
ments and encourage such investments, they may be viewed as desir-
able.  But prices may also be distorted in a way that reduces the value
of nonmarket labor, including child care performed in the household.
A clearer case would need to be made, either on the grounds of offset-
ting current distortions overvaluing such labor, or on the grounds that
work/family policies internalize positive externalities of family struc-
ture, in order to justify them.
Finally, dependent care assistance, whether for children, the eld-
erly, or the disabled, which could be paid directly to either the depen-
dent or to the caregiver, would reduce the income strain associated
with these situations.  The latter two, particularly to the degree that eld-
erly persons have high disability rates, appear to be a reasonable form
of insurance in cases where various problems causing incomplete
insurance markets have made it difficult for individuals and families to
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self-insure.  The former is less defensible on insurance grounds if one
believes that child raising is a freely chosen option, with many of its
benefits accruing to the family itself.
However, insuring against negative outcomes caused by the cir-
cumstances of one’s birth is a reasonable policy to consider.  Assis-
tance targeted to those children who receive negative outcomes (such
as low educational attainment) because of parental investment deci-
sions (and potentially lack of investment funds due to capital market
constraints) would be defensible as a social insurance program against
being born in a family situation where you do not receive as good an
outcome as those in other, more fortunate family situations.  For
instance, for a society in which there is systematic underinvestment in
girls by their families, societal leaders could make the decision to off-
set this underinvestment.  This is clearly an area that needs consider-
ation in a number of developing countries.
The issue therefore appears to come down to choice: To what
degree is the choice of family situation made freely?  What sorts of con-
straints (in the usual economist terms of relative prices and endow-
ments) operate on that choice?  In all societies, one does not choose
what family to be born into, and we have strong equity grounds for min-
imizing the differences caused by birth family circumstance.  In some
societies, arguably including our own, one does choose what family to
create, and the equity grounds for minimizing differences in labor mar-
ket outcomes related to that choice are therefore much less clear.
In conclusion, while the robustness—and policy relevance—of the
findings presented in this chapter is ambiguous, I have found the effects
of family structure on labor outcomes an intriguing area to explore.
Much remains to be done on this topic, and I look forward to reading, as
well as doing my own research, in this area for years to come.
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